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Abstract
Organised crime groups’ involvement in illicit markets is a common focus of 
law enforcement and governments. Drug, weapon, human and wildlife traf-
ficking (and others) are all illegal activities with link to organised crime. This 
paper explores the overlooked illicit market of puppies. We detail the state of 
knowledge about the organisation of the UK puppy trade, which includes irre-
sponsible and illegal breeding of puppies throughout Europe and their often-
illegal movement into the UK. In 2017, we conducted an analysis of hundreds 
of online advertisements in Scotland, 12 expert interviews, a stakeholder sur-
vey of 53 participants, and 40 focus groups across Great Britain. Our data 
suggest an organised illicit market running in parallel to the legal trade. We 
speculate as to whether at some point along the supply chain organised crime 
groups are responsible for the suffering and death of the puppies and the eco-
nomic and emotional damage to ‘consumers’. Online monitoring and physical 
scrutiny at the ports must be improved to reduce non-human animal abuse. 
People buying puppies must also be made aware that their purchase could be 
profiting organised crime.
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Introduction
The pet trade is a lucrative commercial enterprise which involves moving thou-
sands of species and millions of individual non-human animals1 across the globe. 
According to a Council of Europe report, half of European households own a pet of 
some kind, estimated to include almost 7000 different species. The reported value 
of industry turnover for those supplying pets and related goods is estimated to be 
several €10s of billions annually (Davenport and Colins 2016, p. 33). There is grow-
ing evidence that this trade has opened the door to criminality and is increasingly 
of interest to organised crime groups. Aspects of the better-known and larger ille-
gal wildlife trade are facilitated by organised crime and the organised crime aspect 
is increasingly the focus of national and international regulation and enforcement 
(Arroyo-Quiroz and Wyatt 2019; UNODC 2020; Wyatt et al. 2020). Yet, while the 
illegal wildlife trade, including the trafficking of exotic pets and the potential role of 
organised crime, has been the focus of a significant amount of research in the last 
decade (see Arroyo-Quiroz and Wyatt (2019), Collard (2020), Sollund (2019), Van 
Uhm (2016), Wyatt et  al. (2017a), Maher and Sollund (2016), among others), the 
trafficking of ‘domestic’ companion animals2 has received little attention.
This paper explores the emerging lucrative illicit market of puppies, which is 
largely overlooked in academic literature. According to FEDIAF (2020), more than 
85 million households in the European Union had companion animals in 2019. Rus-
sia (not in the EU), Germany and the UK (then in the EU) are thought to have the 
most dogs (16.8, 10.1 and 9 million respectively) with high numbers also in Poland, 
France, Spain and Italy (7.7, 7.6, 7 and 6.7 million dogs) (FEDIAF 2020). This 
buoyant European commercial trade requires an unknown number of puppies to 
meet market demand, which is estimated in just 12 EU member states to be valued 
at €1.3 billion annually (IBF International Consulting et al. 2015). In the UK alone, 
there is an estimated annual sale of between 800,000 and 1.3 million puppies. Sales 
through advertising online are estimated to be worth approximately £130 million per 
annum (Maher and Wyatt 2019). Numerous reports (IBF International Consulting 
et al. 2015; IFAW 2012; Dogs Trust 2014; RSPCA 2012; Four Paws International 
2013) have identified, a sea-change in the scale and nature of the puppy trade—
including significant growth in large-scale industrial commercial breeders, interna-
tional trade and the use of the internet as the medium for third-party sales. Conse-
quently, alongside the organised and expanding legal trade is the development of an 
irresponsible and illegal trade in dogs, with growing evidence that it has attracted 
the attention of criminal networks across Europe.
In our UK research (Maher and Wyatt 2019; Wyatt et al. 2017b), we found puppy 
smuggling is lucrative due to high demand among consumers. Yet it carries little 
2 While this paper specifically refers to the puppy trade, NGO and governmental evidence suggests a 
growing international trade in cats and rabbits.
1 In recognition of the debates surrounding the harms perpetuated by anthropocentric and speciesist dis-
course and the artificial distinction used to distinguish humans from other animals, we use the term non-
human animals herein.
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risk of detection, prosecution or punishment. Consumer behaviour, the preference 
for specific ‘designer’ dogs and implicit trust in online advertising, has greatly facil-
itated the illegal trade, as buyers become increasingly removed from the origins and 
movement of the dogs. Concurrently, we saw that offenders have developed fluid, 
organised and sophisticated strategies to reassure consumers in their purchases. 
Consumer demand is particularly relevant as the desire for dog companionship has 
apparently reached new highs during the ongoing period of isolation and work-
ing from home experienced in the COVID-19 pandemic (Kale 2020). Prior to this, 
puppy trafficking, as part of the European illegal pet trade was linked to serious and 
organised crime (European Parliament 2019) and argued to have become the third 
largest illegal trade in Europe (Eurogroup for Animals 2018). The COVID-19 driven 
market is likely to heighten criminal interest and involvement. A report based on the 
recent conference organised by Eurogroup for Animals (2020, p. 19) on behalf of 
the Croatian Presidency of the Council of the European Union argues “A change of 
attitude is needed in central and local government to accept that the puppy trade is 
controlled by criminal gangs in the same way as the drug trade or human trafficking 
are”. This potential link to organised crime is supported by Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs [HMRC] whose dedicated puppy trade task force recovered over £5 
million in unpaid taxes from 257 cases over a four-year period (HMRC and Stride 
2019), though more information would be needed to firmly link this tax evasion to 
organised crime.
As mentioned, it is impossible to accurately quantify the scale of the European 
or UK puppy trade. Distinguishing between the legal, irresponsible and illegal trade 
is challenging for authorities and consumers. Estimates of the number and value 
of puppies responsibly, irresponsibly, or illegally bred and sold, or of active breed-
ers and sellers and those who are acting unscrupulously, illegally or with organised 
crime groups are problematic. Part of the problem is knowing which aspects and 
actors are involved in organised crime. Thus, we begin by clarifying what consti-
tutes organised crime groups, before sharing our findings on the structure and organ-
isation of the UK puppy trade. There is a vast literature debating and theorising what 
organised crime is. We, too, have contributed to this discussion (Arroyo-Quiroz and 
Wyatt 2019; Wyatt et al. 2020). Without repeating those debates in this paper,3 we 
adopt a more straightforward approach to organised crime by employing the stand-
ardised definition of EUROPOL (2017). This is in part due to space, but also for 
practical reasons, in that we hope our findings can be useful to law enforcement 
agencies across Europe using the conceptualisation and definition of EUROPOL 
when evaluating the organised nature of puppy trafficking.
EUROPOL specifically departs from the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crime’s (UNTOC) definition of organised crime (a group of three or 
more persons existing over a period of time acting in concert with the aim of 
committing crimes for financial or material benefit (UNODC 2000)) because 
3 While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed discussion on the definition of OC 
or OCGs, further examination of the limitations and alternative definitions is provided by Wyatt et  al. 
(2020).
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“this definition does not adequately describe the complex and flexible nature of 
modern organised crime networks” (EUROPOL 2017: no page). EUROPOL’s 
(2017) analysis of organised crime groups [OCGs] has found a variety of struc-
tures (that is, hierarchies, loose temporary networks, small groups etc.) and a 
diversity of actors. Online activities are highly adaptive and lucrative and make 
up a substantial portion of black markets (EUROPOL 2017). Of particular rel-
evance to our analysis of puppy smuggling is EUROPOL’s (2017: no page) 
observation that:
Many OCGs are highly flexible and able to shift from one criminal activity 
to another or to add new criminal activities to their crime portfolio. In many 
cases, OCGs operate on an on-demand basis and only become active once new 
profit opportunities emerge.
The integration of digital systems in many criminal activities and the expan-
sion of the online trade in illicit goods and services is transforming serious and 
organised crime. Criminals are increasingly adapting the supply chain models 
of global online retailers.
We will return to this when assessing whether puppy trafficking is an organised 
crime.
Based on empirical research conducted in the UK in 2017, this paper evalu-
ates the involvement of criminal organisations in the illegal puppy trade in the 
UK and possibly Europe. The research is situated within the distinct field of 
green criminology, a critical harms-based discourse, which focuses on exposing 
and challenging harms to animals and the environment (Beirne and South 2007; 
South and Brisman 2020). Green criminology, like organised crime research, is 
concerned with crimes of the powerful and crimes of great volume and (financial 
and welfare) cost. To ensure non-human animals are visible as victims (Beirne 
1999), a broad definition of harm is adopted herein. The harms involved are 
viewed as serious crimes which deserve consideration alongside other serious 
and organised crimes. First, we briefly outline the methodology employed to con-
duct our data collection. We then provide an overview of the nature of the legal 
puppy trade in the UK gleaned from that research and literature4; in particular, 
we propose how the trade is structured and who the actors are along the supply 
chain. This is followed by details of the impact of the trade and of trafficking. We 
then detail the key research findings to identify the points along the supply chain 
and elements of the trade which are consistent with EUROPOL’s conceptualisa-
tion of OCGs. In particular, the behaviour of key stakeholders, such as the breed-
ers, sellers, consumers and enforcement agencies are considered. We conclude 
by considering the implications associated with the involvement of OCGs in the 
illegal puppy trade and the responses to this element of the trade in the context of 
the wider political and economic climate.
4 While it is beyond the scope of this article to provide a detailed review of past literature, an annotated 
bibliography and literature review is available in Wyatt et al. 2017b
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Methodology
In 2017, a mixed-methods research design, involving a systematic literature 
review and five stages of empirical data collection was adopted to determine the 
prevalence, nature and impact of the illegal puppy trade. While the initial pro-
ject focused on Scotland, additional funding expanded the study to England and 
Wales. The literature reviewed included academic and grey literature from the 
UK, but also the wider European community and the US. Empirical data col-
lection involved conducting an analysis of hundreds of online advertisements in 
Scotland, 12 expert interviews, a stakeholder survey of 53 participants, and 40 
focus groups across Great Britain. From October 2016, all online advertisements 
for puppies in Scotland in seven key websites (Craigslist, Dogs & Puppies UK, 
Epupz, Freeads, Gumtree, Pets for Homes, and Pets Viva Street) were monitored 
for 12  weeks. Where possible, data was collected on the Local Authority (LA) 
location, breed, number per litter and sex of the puppies, price per puppy and in 
total, phone number, name of the seller, Kennel Club and LA registration, and any 
other information. To further understand the economics of the puppy trade, the 
Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) TRACES database was analysed. The 
database records the legal movement of dogs for commercial purposes (including 
rescues) and identifies transgressions within this trade. Trading Standards Scot-
land data details recorded complaints from puppy purchasers.
The semi-structured expert interviews included people with specialist knowl-
edge and/or direct experience in responding to the puppy trade (i.e. NGOs, veteri-
narians, government employees and breeding standards organisation—quotations 
from these interviews are coded as ‘EI’—expert interview and a number). This 
was supplemented by an online survey used to capture the experiences of 53 key 
stakeholders working in related fields (i.e. dog walkers, groomers, trainers, board-
ers, and veterinarians) in order to learn about their dealings with consumers and 
their puppies, who may have come from irresponsible or illegal sources. Draw-
ing upon findings from the economic, online advertisement, expert interview and 
online survey data, consumer focus groups were conducted (25 face-to-face and 
15 over the phone) with 160 people around Great Britain who were considering 
buying or had recently (within the last two years) bought a puppy. Data were ana-
lysed through SPSS and NVIVO.
In recognition of the existing data limitations, this multi-method triangulated 
research design was utilised to validate the findings and negate some of the limi-
tations (a majority of which stem from the samples obtained). For example, the 
purposive expert sample was small and through the snowballing process identi-
fied a larger number of NGOs with experience in responding to the trade. Con-
sequently, the findings should be read to represent the values and experiences 
of a small number of experts, with an emphasis on NGO viewpoints. Both the 
survey and the focus groups are limited by selection bias. It is likely that only 
those people concerned about dog welfare chose to participate; the focus group 
demographics, for example, were mostly women aged over thirty. While the focus 
groups involved consumers, who bought through ‘assured’ breeders, registered 
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breeders, friends, ‘backroom’ breeders, online traders, and illegal traders, those 
who had inadvertently or purposefully bought puppies from irresponsible and/or 
illegal sources were underrepresented. Participation was voluntary and due to the 
sensitive and emotional nature of the topic, those who engaged with questionable 
actions or who experienced the death of their puppies were unlikely to partici-
pate. Despite these limitations, the data collected represent all the key stakehold-
ers in the puppy trade and provide useful insights into whether or not the illegal 
trade involves OCGs.
The nature of the puppy trade
First, we provide an overview of the scale and value of the puppy trade in the UK, 
highlighting the structure and actors along the supply chain and the impact of the 
trade.
Scale and value
As mentioned, the scale of the puppy trade is difficult to estimate. And the illegal 
trade is particularly difficult to address due to its hidden nature, the inconsist-
ent data collection and sharing, the multiple regulatory frameworks and agen-
cies, and limited law enforcement capacity, very little of which is specialised. The 
two—legal and illegal—are also intertwined and difficult to untangle. Thus, when 
speaking of scale and value it is hard to distinguish between legal and illegal. For 
example, one interviewee indicated that when the Irish government trade data-
base recorded approximately 3,000 puppies as being transported commercially to 
the UK, he was able to “directly follow over 52,000 pups to the UK every year 
and that was the ones we knew about” (Wyatt et al. 2017b). As stated, it is not 
clear which of these are legal and which are not. Another example comes from 
the Dogs Trust (2018). A Hungarian puppy dealer detailed the weekly exporta-
tion of approximately 400 puppies from just his hometown, suggesting a trade 
of 20,000 puppies a year from one village. With an average price of £1400 per 
puppy, the annual turnover is £28 million. In this case, the trade was considered 
illegal because of the lack of registration and welfare. RSPCA inspector Briggs, 
from the special operations unit, has argued that criminals are driven by immense 
profits, with in-demand ‘handbag’ dogs “bought in Eastern Europe for as little as 
£20 ($29) and sold for as much as £1200 ($1700) in the UK, allowing even small-
scale operators to make thousands of pounds every week” (Parkinson 2016: no 
page). Even though the exact amount of illegal trade is unknown, the Biocrime 
project which documents the trade of animals across the Austrian-Italian border 
found 53% of pets traded across the border had no documentation (Eurogroup for 
Animals 2020). Thus, there is the possibility that the illegal portion of the puppy 
trade is as, if not more substantial, than the legal trade.
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Structure and actors
The puppy trade has numerous stages and within these stages there are a variety of 
activities undertaken by a diverse group of actors (see Table 1). Portions of the trade 
may be all, or a mixture of:
1. legal regulated trade (in compliance with the complex interplay of local level 
governance and international regulations on breeding, rearing, movement, trade, 
selling and the welfare of the dogs)
2. legal unregulated trade (below the threshold requiring domestic regulation)
3. illegal trade (non-compliant with international and national regulations).
The legal (both regulated and unregulated) and illegal trade of puppies are multi-
stage processes. According to the data, those profiting from the puppy trade are a 
mixture of individuals selling occasional litters, hobby breeders, and small and large 
commercial enterprises. Across these groups, there are examples of good practice 
(such as complying with online advertising minimum standards, and vetting per-
spective buyers), evidence of unscrupulous breeders and traders (e.g. irresponsi-
ble breeding, rearing, and sales practices) and illegal activities (such as importing 
commercial dogs as pets, evading taxes, or using fraudulent pet passports). Experts 
described illegal actors as non-compliant individuals, organised crime groups and 
ancillaries (e.g. for transport). While it is not currently possible to identify the extent 
or specific roles occupied by OCGs in the trade, experts indicated actors in the ille-
gal trade are becoming increasingly organised and sophisticated in their operation 
and existing crime groups are moving into the puppy trade. The diversity of actors 
adds to the difficulty in identifying the nature (and prevalence) of the legal and ille-
gal trades. Those who are legitimate can easily become non-compliant, while those 
who purposefully smuggle and organise the illegal trade can use the legitimate trade 
to do so (e.g. laundering dogs).
To breed and sell puppies, actors must plan which dogs to buy and where to 
house them. Although regulations differ across the EU, if breeding enough dogs and 
acting legally, most likely the breeder must obtain a license or permit. Inspections 
by local authorities and veterinarians5 would also likely be involved at this stage 
(2 and 3 in Table 1). To commercially sell these puppies across the EU the regula-
tions6 require the premises of origin to be a registered business. In the UK, licensed 
breeders are required to breed within the determined limitations of their establish-
ment and welfare of individual mother dogs and provide a set standard of care and 
welfare. Non-compliance is evident in the illegal domestic trade, however, similar 
abuses among international breeding establishments is not necessarily illegal as 
there is no UK control over the breeding rates and conditions of puppies arriving 
5 See for example, The Animal Welfare (Breeding of Dogs) (Wales) Regulations 2014 [UK] or Dog 
Breeding Establishment Guidelines 2018 [Ireland].
6 Balai Directive [Council Directive 92/65/EEC].
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from these establishments. The aforementioned IBF (2015) study found significant 
inconsistencies in licensing requirements and levels of compliance across EU mem-
ber states. The possession of a licence or a registered business is no guarantee of 
legality or appropriate animal welfare standards. Our study respondents (i.e. experts, 
stakeholders and consumers) indicated limited enforcement resources resulted in 
poor licensing compliance and provided substantial opportunities for illegal trade. 
Further, in the UK, where it is possible to breed puppies unregulated (e.g. under the 
legal threshold of three litters a year) it is possible to trade illegally under the guise 
of unregulated legal trade.
To transport puppies internationally (Stage 4), either commercially or as com-
panion animals, veterinarians must complete a health certificate (ITAHC) or a 
pet passport [PETS].7 Covert investigations by NGOs repeatedly identified many 
veterinarians in Eastern European countries who were paid to forge paperwork 
to facilitate the movement of puppies too young to legally travel. This research 
revealed inadequate and few checks at the borders, infamously evidenced by the 
ability to repeatedly import a stuffed, rather than a live, puppy into the UK (Dogs 
Trust 2014, 2018). During this stage of the (il)legal trade, transportation compa-
nies and their workers should encounter the puppies, dealers and persons trans-
porting them. This may be airlines, but more commonly involves ferry companies 
or agencies operating tunnels and other border crossings (i.e. Eurotunnel between 
France and England). To avoid commercial checks, widespread abuse of PETS, 
implemented in 2012 to facilitate companion animals travelling with their own-
ers across EU borders, was consistently identified by experts. As each person in 
a vehicle can travel with up to five companion animals, it has become a viable 
mechanism for illegal commercial sales. Furthermore, the movement of compan-
ion animals under PETS is not recorded, permitting offenders to make repeated 
journeys with different dogs without being identified. The increase in commercial 
imports to the UK, during COVID-19 restrictions on non-commercial movement 
across borders, supports this premise. While the movement of dogs to England 
and Wales under PETS declined by 88% in May (compared to previous years), 
the movement of commercial dogs, measured by Intra Trade Animal Health Cer-
tificates (ITAHC) (issued between March and October 2020) rose by 87% (on 
numbers for May to September 2019)—the highest number of ITAHCs issued 
monthly since records began (RSPCA 2020). Whereas 5 years ago most puppies 
were being transported in vans, it is now thought that cars, being less conspicuous, 
are increasingly being used to transport puppies internationally throughout Europe 
(Eurogroup for Animals 2020). Experts in our research identified a fluid network 
of offenders, who were swift to respond to enforcement changes.
7 For the commercial movement of dogs (including a change of ownership or consignments of 5 or more 
pets) within the EU an Intra Trade Animal Health Certificate (ITAHC) must be completed prior to depar-
ture. For the non-commercial movement of pets (e.g. less than six companion dogs) a PET passport must 
be completed prior to departure. Under the NI Protocol, from 1 January 2021, regulation No 576/2013 
will continue to apply to travel between NI, EU Member States and Third Countries, however Great Brit-
ain (GB) has become a ‘Part II Listed’ Third Country, for the purposes of pet travel. Dogs travelling from 
GB to the EU must now complete an Animal Health Certificate.
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Stage 5—advertising—may overlap with previous stages as puppies are adver-
tised before being born, early in their lives, or when they are ready to be trans-
ported—creating an on-demand process. Advertisements may be placed from 
outside of the destination country of the puppies. For instance, we found that adver-
tisements even with local addresses in Scotland could be for puppies bred out of 
the country, but being sold by local third-party people, who had not bred the pup-
pies (Wyatt et  al. 2017a, b). In response to UK awareness campaigns, local sell-
ers used fake houses and female dogs to allow consumers to view puppies in their 
‘home’ with their ‘mother’. That way during Stage 6—selling—consumers visiting 
perspective puppies do not suspect the puppy has come from out of the country and/
or a puppy farm. Furthermore, the seller is not re-traceable due to their frequent 
movements from rented accommodation. While UK legislation has recently become 
more robust (e.g., Lucy’s Law), requiring all online advertisements from businesses 
to provide crucial information for traceability and prohibiting third-party sales, this 
is not adequately enforced, and the latter does not currently apply to international 
trade. Although the income from all regulated legal puppy sales should be reported 
to the relevant tax authority, the recent HMRC figures detailed above indicate con-
siderable tax evasion.
Impact and implications
The puppy trade requires the systematic exploitation of dogs. Within the UK 
regulated trade minimum standards of welfare and treatment can reduce some of 
these harms, while the harms experienced by dogs in the illegal and irresponsible 
trade are pervasive, diverse, and serious (Dogs Trust 2018; Eurogroup for Animals 
2020). The impact begins at the point of origin and is evident at every stage in the 
trade, including post-purchase. Harms to the non-human animals include, but are 
not restricted to, inappropriate breeding (with exaggerated features or with inher-
ited disorders that compromise welfare), health (no or inappropriate veterinary 
care, removal from mother too early, exposure to diseases, premature death), liv-
ing (unsanitary, cramped and noisy housing, poor care, undernourishment, inabil-
ity to express natural behaviours, no socialisation with other dogs or people) and 
transportation conditions (inappropriate housing, long journeys without access to 
food, water or breaks, without appropriate vaccinations to avoid disease transmis-
sion), and abandonment and euthanasia (due to poor compatibility with owners, 
long term health problems and/or behavioural problems).8 The (il)legal commer-
cial exploitation of millions of non-human animals causes extensive and persis-
tent suffering, with little recognition of animal sentience. This is despite extensive 
scientific basis evidencing they are sentient and can and do experience pain and 
pleasure. Within the illegal trade, animal welfare is frequently sacrificed as profits 
are likely, even when a large percentage of animals die pre- or post-sale, because 
of these conditions:
8 Further details on the specific harms in the trade are detailed in Wyatt et al. (2017b).
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if you’ve got 40 … and three happen to die they’re just getting kicked out at 
a lay-by… if I pick up 100 and I only end up with 50 I’m still going to make 
a good profit out of it” [EI4].
the cost of production is so low they’re willing to take a chance and bring 
a hundred pups over and maybe getting ten of them alive... and they’ll still 
make it worth their while [EI5].
Arguably, as puppies are traded as commodities, the legal trade does not need 
to provide for the sentience of their ‘products’, ensuring it is easy for the legal 
and illegal trades to blur. As Lynch et  al. (2013) argue, the harms implicit in 
the puppy trade can be explained by the political economic context of consumer 
culture.
Negative impact extends well beyond the puppies (and their mothers) in the 
trade; experts argued it has an effect on the state of the nation’s dogs’ health with: 
known diseases outbreaks, the potential introduction of new diseases, and long 
term behavioural and health issues resulting from inappropriate breeding, rear-
ing, transportation and socialisation of puppies. These issues in turn impact the 
financial stability of the legitimate puppy market, consumers, government agen-
cies, NGOs, and the UK public, which have to contend with the health (zoonotic 
diseases—see also Zucca et al 2020) and social consequences of the illegal trade, 
as well as try to respond to it. The involvement of OCGs in the trade presents 
increased and new serious consequences, including illicit gains financing other 
serious criminality. This is exacerbated by the increased distance between con-
sumer and breeder. The rural isolated location of puppy farms and their flow to 
urban centres, often in other countries, ensures that welfare and public health 
issues are largely invisible to consumers (Maher and Wyatt 2019). The growth in 
third-party and online sales establishes further distance between consumers and 
the lived experiences of puppies in the trade.
Criminal actors exploit legislative loopholes, enforcement capabilities and 
consumer detachment to manipulate and hide behind the legal trade. As indicated 
above, each stage of the legal regulated trade requires paperwork, documenta-
tion and/or regulation of some sort—a license, a veterinarian check, a paperwork/
microchip check at the border and more recently online in the UK. Evidence sug-
gests paperwork can be easily forged, or fraudulent versions used to make the 
trade appear legal and that the puppy has the proper documentation, treatments 
and age to be sold. Consequently, since 2015 (UK) Border Force have recognised 
the possible involvement of OCGs in puppy trade networks. This has been echoed 
by key NGOs and transport carriers, who have reported the “sheer number of 
illegal puppies—one in every tenth car” and “widespread and organised criminal 
network and activity” (APHA 2017: no page). Nonetheless, due to the diverse 
nature of the illegal trade, especially embedded within the legal trade, meeting 
records from a 2016 RSPCA and DEFRA organised workshop identified “there 
are still huge unknowns in how the criminal networks operate” (APHA 2017: no 
page). The puppy trade, in both its legal and illegal forms, is organised, but this 
does not necessarily mean OCGs are involved. The next section unpacks these 
connections drawing on the conceptualisation of OCGs by EUROPOL.
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The role of organised crime in the trade
As indicated by the structure and actors outlined in Table 1, the puppy trade is an 
organised industry. The illegal aspect of the trade is structured around numerous 
offenders across-borders and intertwined inextricably with the legal trade. Added 
to this is an increasingly lucrative market, with few potential risks for offend-
ers, leadings us to speculate that the market could be vulnerable to infiltration by 
OCGs.
The first factor that makes such infiltration possible is the international and 
national dimensions of the trade. In the UK context, there are incoming (il)legal 
flows from Ireland and several Eastern European countries. The extensiveness of 
this movement and the coordination required to successfully move live ‘contra-
band’ over such distances means the criminals are likely to be well-funded and 
well-connected. This level of sophistication makes it possible that OCGs could be 
undertaking at least the smuggling element of the illegal puppy trade. The exten-
sive amount of movement within countries, again in the UK in particular, also 
supports this possibility. For example, puppies are moved through an organised 
and sophisticated distribution network across the UK:
So puppies are basically coming in from Central and Eastern Europe, but 
that’s your starting point, but these puppies will be distributed right across 
the country. The individuals involved are becoming very clever…Certainly 
we’re aware that some of the service stations down in Kent are being used 
for the transfer of puppies, not necessarily to owners… they’re effectively 
using a distribution network to get them across the country [EI2].
Connected to the international element is the use of ports by these criminals. 
Ports and border crossings are corruptible; bribes to officials create paid corri-
dors for contraband to be moved. Corruption, and bribery specifically, is a known 
aspect of how OCGs operate (EUROPOL 2017; Wyatt et al. 2020).
The second factor is the blurred line between the legal pet trade to facilitate 
trafficking. Illegal wildlife trade research documents how organised criminals 
exploit regulatory loopholes and launder illegally caught animals using fake doc-
uments to trade them as captive bred (Wyatt et  al. 2020). Wyatt et  al. identify 
the intertwined relationship between legitimate formal organisations and exter-
nal groups characterises much wildlife trafficking. Within the puppy trade, the 
link to the legitimate industry provides the necessary documents and processes 
to launder and exploit loopholes. The use of forged and fraudulent paperwork 
and bribery, and the aforementioned PETS puppy movement loophole are well 
documented in the puppy trade. That puppy farming in Eastern Europe is legal 
presents an excellent opportunity and business model to mass produce puppies 
that are worth over £1000 in a location that is relatively cheap (costing as lit-
tle as £25 per puppy). Engagement with an organised network of legitimate and 
illegitimate actors allows an increase in scale and sophistication, reducing costs 
and risks and increasing fluidity and profits. Given the infrastructure required to 
breed and move puppies, linking up with established businesses provides OCGs 
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with easy access to a low risk, high profit enterprise. The limited regulation and 
enforcement of the legal trade is key to the value and success of this overlap. The 
involvement of these various types of actors was evidenced in our stakeholder 
survey; respondents (n = 53) identified illegal puppy suppliers as mostly part 
of an organised network (43 respondents), but also opportunistic offenders (30 
respondents) and part of legitimate business (20 respondents).
The profits from the illegal puppy trade are substantial and increasing, which 
is the third factor indicating possible involvement of OCGs. This stems from the 
increasing volume of consumer demand and competition for designer breeds (inflat-
ing their value), which has reportedly expanded during COVID-19 (Kale 2020), and 
the absence of a legitimate market to fully meet this demand. It is noteworthy that 
in both the expert interviews and consumer focus groups the threat of violence was 
reported when engaging with illegal/irresponsible sellers and breeders. The use or 
threat of violence is one of the main resources used by OCGs to maintain profits. 
Finally, the illegal puppy trade is flexible and has a complex modus operandi linked 
to digital systems (Stage 5—advertising). The puppy trade has changed rapidly in 
response to market conditions and demands (linked to consumer purchasing pref-
erences, breeding rates, keeping up with ‘fashion’ and now with COVID-19). The 
supply chain mirrors that of global online retailers, whereby breeding, advertising, 
and selling coincides with peak purchasing months (e.g., Christmas and Spring). 
Online shopping also appeals to the nature of consumers: need for instant gratifi-
cation, impulse buying with little research, trust in the internet as a buying tool, 
and willingness to buy without evidence of the conditions of the breeding or rear-
ing. Consequently, the move to digital systems has greatly facilitated the ability of 
offenders to adapt and organise themselves. OCGs are known to have adapted their 
practices to the digital age; the puppy trade provides an ideal opportunity to use 
deception online, while relying on consumers to make emotion-driven purchases 
and the absence of adequate regulation.
The UNTOC definition of OCGs outlines the number of actors (three or more 
people), their longevity (over a substantial time period) and their purpose (acting 
to make money or other material gains). As we indicated, EUROPOL has expanded 
upon what they felt was a definition that did not capture important elements of the 
nature of OCG activities:
OCGs operate in a criminal economy dictated by the laws of supply and 
demand and are favoured by social tolerance for certain types of crime…indi-
vidual criminals and criminal groups are flexible and quickly adapt to exploit 
new victims, to evade countermeasures or identify new criminal opportunities 
(EUROPOL 2017: no page).
Alongside this, EUROPOL point to the adoption of new technologies, in particu-
lar the expansion of online trade, document fraud, and money laundering. These fac-
tors, which shape European organised crime, are evident in the illegal puppy trade. 
In particular, the international and national dimensions of the trade, the link between 
legitimate and illegitimate trade, flexible and complex modus operandi, exploitation 
of consumers and vulnerable non-human animals, financial reward in the trade, use 
of online technology and links to document fraud and tax evasion—all of which we 
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outlined above. Although we did not find concrete evidence or specific groups in our 
data, the structure and composition of the illegal puppy trade seem to lend to what 
EUROPOL and others know about how OCGs operate in Europe. Importantly, we 
need to be vigilant to the possibility as there are significant implications if OCGs are 
or do become actors in the illegal puppy trade, as we now discuss.
Implications
We conclude by considering the implications associated with the involvement of 
OCGs in the puppy trade and responding to this element of the trade in the context 
of the wider political and economic climate.
Harms
As we noted above, there is extensive suffering and death of the puppies and breed-
ing mothers in the trade. Their poor health and wellbeing further impact the general 
dog population, public health and have negative financial and social consequences 
that extend to the government, civil society and the public. OCG involvement in the 
trade will exacerbate these harms. First, the scale and severity of the abuse expe-
rienced by the dogs will escalate, alongside the increased volume of dog’s bred 
and traded and the development of processes aimed to maximise profits. This will 
increase the potential for zoonotic diseases, negative behaviour and health, and 
the abandonment, and euthanasia of healthy dogs. The international dimensions of 
the trade particularly exacerbate health concerns; the Netherlands and France have 
traced rabies cases back to puppies imported from non-rabies-free countries (Dia-
mantopoulou 2019). Second, OCGs are difficult to combat. Such groups have sig-
nificant resources to prevent being detected and to avoid prosecution if caught. Their 
financial and political power, and fluidity and sophistication would significantly 
change the responses and resources necessary to tackle the trade. The final concern 
is the consequences of the substantial profits from the illegal puppy trade support-
ing organised crime. Tens or hundreds of millions of pounds from the illegal sale of 
puppies could be entering the bank accounts of OCGs and supporting other criminal 
markets like drugs and weapons. Regardless of OCGs presence in the illegal puppy 
trade, efforts should be made to reduce this black market, but the involvement of 
OCGs may change what those efforts should be.
Regulation and enforcement
The current approach to regulating the puppy trade and the limited enforcement 
and resources given to this regulation do not work. Changes are required which 
target the modus operandi of the criminal networks. Traceability is key. Universal 
puppy microchipping recorded in a harmonised European Identification and Reg-
istration system to track international movement would greatly facilitate preven-
tion, detection and control. The EU Regulation on Transmissible Animal Diseases 
Animal Health Law coming into force April 2021 will provide this transparency 
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and oversight; however, it will not include the UK. Transparency and monitoring 
online are also central to removing the anonymity enjoyed by advertisers. This could 
include compulsory registration and visible tax numbers for all dog sellers (as is the 
case in France, CAROcat 2015) and mandatory seller verification and compliance 
checks by online platforms. Enhanced online traceability is part of the proposed 
EU Digital Service Act, which will also not apply to the UK. In the UK context, 
Brexit presented a unique opportunity to make enforcement robust with the possi-
bility to change PETS, but it is not clear at the time of writing that such steps have 
been taken in the new legislation being debated (e.g. increasing the minimum age 
requirement for moving or importing dogs, decreasing the numbers permitted and 
enhancing rabies requirements—EFRA 2020; McCulloch 2019). Of particular con-
cern for the UK puppy trade is that animal sentience was not included in the UK’s 
withdrawal bill from the EU although it is recognised in the Lisbon Treaty. While 
the UK Government has stated they will draft UK legislation that reflects animal 
sentience before the UK leaves the EU, this still has not taken place. There is the 
risk that the UK will be placed in a worse position as the EU improves their animal 
welfare legislation and tracing system and the UK is not integrated into these initia-
tives (i.e. the EU Action Plan against illegal trade in cats and dogs). Traceability has 
become even more important given COVID-19 and trade involving non-EU coun-
tries and Russia (Eurogroup for Animals 2020).
Improved monitoring and physical scrutiny (e.g. visual checks) at the ports and of 
breeding establishments are required to stop the spread of disease and protect public 
health, but also to reduce the abuse of non-human animals. Criminal networks and 
black markets, such as puppy trafficking, are flexible. Thus, enforcement also needs 
to be flexible, meaning law enforcement must have the resources necessary to be 
flexible and respond to the changing black markets. Law enforcement should also be 
given and trained to use a wider range of tools. For instance, the process for seizure 
of criminal assets in drug trafficking cases should be applied in cases of puppy traf-
ficking. Lastly, puppy-trade campaigns aimed at consumers (e.g. Lucy’s Law, Pet 
fished) must emphasise that their purchase could be profiting organised crime.
Conclusion
Despite growing concerns among NGOs, enforcement agencies, politicians (EFRA 
2020) and the public, the illegal puppy trade is a buoyant and lucrative enterprise, 
multifarious in its nature, harm and the complexities it poses. There is growing evi-
dence that legal pet trades—in wildlife and domestic animals—have opened the 
door to criminality and are increasingly of interest to OCGs. While the former has 
been addressed in academic literature, the trafficking of ‘domestic’ companion ani-
mals is largely overlooked. Likewise, within organised crime studies, non-human 
animals, especially domesticated animals, are mostly ignored. This paper has aimed 
to fill this disparity by detailing the findings of a UK multi-method qualitative study 
on the nature and impact of the illegal puppy trade to evaluate the role of OCGs.
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The study identified a trade, international in scope, involving complicated stages, 
activities, and actors. The structure and actors outlined herein indicate the puppy 
trade is an organised industry. The illegal trade is structured around numerous 
offenders across-borders and intertwined inextricably with the legal trade. Added to 
this is the ability of criminal actors to respond fluidly to the changing market, and 
exploit legislative loopholes, enforcement capabilities and consumer detachment. 
Growing consumer demand makes the trade attractive to criminal actors, who can 
tap into the emotive desire for dogs. Regrettably, as their value to people grows, so 
too does their value for criminals and their likeliness to experience suffering and 
death. The material objectification inherent in the trade leaves an increasing number 
of dogs vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Their suffering poses serious harm to 
public health and has negative financial and social consequences that extend to the 
government, civil society, and the public. Yet, criminal actors manipulate and hide 
behind the legal trade, with little risk of detection or punishment.
Although our study did not specifically identify OCGs, using the EUROPOL 
definition, the factors shaping European organised crime are evident in the illegal 
puppy trade. In particular, the international and national dimensions of the trade, 
the link between legitimate and illegitimate trade, flexible and complex modus oper-
andi, exploitation of consumers and vulnerable non-human animals, financial reward 
in the trade, use of online technology and links to document fraud and tax evasion.
Although the European Parliament (2019) links the European illegal pet trade to 
serious and organised crime, we lack clarity on the involvement of OCGs in the 
puppy trade. Despite this uncertainty changes are needed to the regulation and 
enforcement of the trade, which suffers from a general lack of awareness and pri-
oritisation, limited data collection and resources, and inadequate penalties. Current 
legislation does not recognise the reality of this trade, providing loopholes which 
are exploited by criminals. Understanding the role and modus operandi of OCGs 
has important implications for developing targeted prevention and detection strate-
gies. Transparency and traceability in the origin and movement of puppies, along-
side improving the physical/visual scrutiny and monitoring at borders and online, 
are central to such a targeted response. Arguably Brexit and COVID-19 provide sig-
nificant opportunities to both reform the puppy trade and non-human (and human) 
animal welfare in the UK. However, at the time of writing, policy development indi-
cates insufficient commitment and clarity for such potential to be realised. This is 
particularly problematic at a time whereby key EU responses to the trade are coming 
into effect (e.g. EU Animal Health Law, EU Digital Services Act, Bio-crime Model 
(Zucca et  al 2020)) and there is growing recognition of the need for international 
collaboration and cooperation, especially in response to this emerging organised 
crime.
Acknowledgements We would like to thank the experts, stakeholders, and puppy owners who engaged in 
the research process and the gatekeepers who facilitated the interviews and focus groups. We would also 
like to express our gratitude to Andrew Voas and others at the Scottish Government as well as all of the 
members of the project steering group for their helpful comments throughout the project.
Funding This paper stems from research funded by the Scottish government and DEFRA in 2017.
 Trends in Organized Crime
1 3
Declarations 
Conflict of interest The authors have no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose. The au-
thors have no conflicts of interest to declare that are relevant to the content of this article. All authors 
certify that they have no affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any financial in-
terest or non-financial interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript. The authors 
have no financial or proprietary interests in any material discussed in this article.
Consent to participate Informed consent was obtained from all individual participants included in the 
study.
Ethical approval Approval was obtained from the ethics committee of Northumbria University. The 
research methods used in this study adhere to the ethical code of practice.
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as 
you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Com-
mons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article 
are included in the article’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is 
not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission 
directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http:// creat iveco mmons. org/ licen 
ses/ by/4. 0/.
References
Animal and Plant Health [APHA] (2017) Response to a freedom of information 2000 request. https:// 
assets. publi shing. servi ce. gov. uk/ gover nment/ uploa ds/ system/ uploa ds/ attac hment_ data/ file/ 643330/ 
ATIC1 140. pdf. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Arroyo-Quiroz I, Wyatt T (2019) Wildlife trafficking between the European Union and Mexico. Int J 
Crime Justice Soc Democr 8(3):23–37
Beirne P (1999) For a nonspeciesist criminology. Animal abuse as an object of study. Criminology 
37:1:117–147
Beirne P, South N (2007) Issues in green criminology. Routledge, London
CAROcat (2015) France: a new law to limit private breeding of dogs and cats and internet trade in these 
animals. http:// caroc at. eu/ france- a- new- law- to- limit- priva te- breed ing- of- dogs- and- cats- and- inter 
net- trade- of- these- anima ls/. Accessed 02 Nov 2020
Collard R (2020) Animal traffic: lively capital in the global exotic pet trade. Duke University Press, 
Raleigh
Davenport K, Collins J (2016) European code of conduct on pets and invasive Aline species. Council of 
Europe. https:// easin. jrc. ec. europa. eu/ easin/ Docum ent/ Europ eanCo deofC onduct/ Publi cation_ Code_ 
of_ condu ct_ pets_ IAS_ 2016_ web. pdf. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Diamantopoulou G (2019) Animal health law: a power tool against illegal puppy trade? EURACTIV. 
https:// www. eurac tiv. com/ secti on/ agric ulture- food/ opini on/ animal- health- law-a- power- tool- again st- 
illeg al- puppy- trade/. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Dogs Trust (2014) The puppy smuggling scandal: an investigation into the illegal entry of dogs into Great 
Britain under the Pets Travel Scheme. Dogs Trust, London
Dogs Trust (2018) Puppy smuggling: when will this cruel trade end? https:// www. dogst rust. org. uk/ 
puppy- smugg ling/ 111018_ puppy% 20smu ggling% 202018_ final. pdf. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs [EFRA] Select Committee (2020) Formal meeting (oral evidence 
session): pet smuggling. https:// commi ttees. parli ament. uk/ event/ 2652/ formal- meeti ng- oral- evide 
nce- sessi on/. Accessed 25 Nov 2020
1 3
Trends in Organized Crime 
Eurogroup for Animals (2018) Booming online puppy trade: illegal, fraudulent and heart-breaking for 
dogs and buyers. https:// www. eurog roupf orani mals. org/ news/ boomi ng- online- puppy- trade- illeg al- 
fraud ulent- and- heart break ing- dogs- and- buyers. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Eurogroup for Animals (2020) The illegal pet trade: game over. Report June 2020. https:// www. eurog 
roupf orani mals. org/ sites/ eurog roup/ files/ 2020- 06/ Report_ Illeg al% 20Pet% 20Tra de_% 20Game% 
20Over_ 2020. pdf. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
European Parliament (2019) Texts adopted. https:// www. europ arl. europa. eu/ doceo/ docum ent/ TA-8- 2016- 
0065_ EN. pdf? redir ect. Accessed 02 Nov 2020
EUROPOL (2017) Defining serious and organised crime. https:// www. europ ol. europa. eu/ socta/ 2017/ 
defin ing- serio us- and- organ ised- crime. html# top. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
FEDIAF (2020) European Facts & Figures  2019. https:// fediaf. org/ images/ FEDIAF_ facts_ and_ figs_ 
2019_ cor- 35- 48. pdf. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Four Paws International (2013) Puppy Trade in Europe: research on the impact of illegal businesses on 
the market, on consumers, on the one-health concept and on animal welfare. Four Paws Interna-
tional, Vienna
HM Revenue & Customs and Stride, Rt Hon M (2019) Millions raised from tax evading dog breeders. 
https:// www. gov. uk/ gover nment/ news/ milli ons- raised- from- tax- evadi ng- dog- breed ers Accessed 2 
Nov 2020
IBF International Consulting, VetEffect, Wageningen University and Research Centre, and Istituto Zoo-
profilattico Sperimentale dell’Abruzzo e del Molise "G. Caporale" (2015) Study on the welfare of 
dogs and cats in commercial practices. Specific Contract SANCO 2013/12364: Final Report. Euro-
pean Commission. https:// ec. europa. eu/ food/ sites/ food/ files/ anima ls/ docs/ aw_ eu- strat egy_ study_ 
dogs- cats- comme rcial- pract ices_ en. pdf. Accessed 02 Nov 2020
International Fund for Animal Welfare [IFAW] (2012) How much is that Doggie on my browser: the truth 
behind online puppy sales. IFAW, Washington
Kale S (2020) Dogs of woe: the pull of a pooch in Covid times. The Guardian. https:// www. thegu ardian. 
com/ lifea ndsty le/ 2020/ oct/ 18/ dogs- of- woe- the- pull- of-a- pooch- in- covid- times? CMP= fb_ gu& utm_ 
medium= Socia l& utm_ source= Faceb ook# Echob ox= 16030 16802. Accessed 3 Nov 2020
Lynch MJ, Long MA, Barrett KL, Stretesky PB (2013)  Is it a crime to produce ecological disorgani-
zation? Why green criminology and political economy matter in the analysis of global ecological 
harms. Br J Criminol 53(6)997–1016. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1093/ bjc/ azt051
Maher J, Sollund R (2016) Law enforcement of the illegal wildlife trafficking: a comparative strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis of the UK and Norway. Journal of Trafficking, 
Organized Crime and Security 2(1):82–9
Maher J, Wyatt T (2019) Rural-urban dynamic in the UK illegal puppy trade: the trade and trafficking of 
Man’s Best Friend. Int J Rural Law Policy. https:// doi. org/ 10. 5130/ ijrlp.2. 2019. 6266
McCulloch S (2019) Brexit and animal welfare impact assessment: analysis of the opportunities brexit 
presents for animal protection in the UK, EU, and internationally. Animals 9(11):10. https:// doi. org/ 
10. 3390/ ani91 10877
Parkinson C (2016) How puppy smuggling is boosting organised crime across Europe. Vice News. 
https:// www. vice. com/ en/ artic le/ mbnpdx/ how- puppy- smugg ling- is- boost ing- organ ized- crime- 
across- europe-1. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals [RSPCA] (2012) Do puppies have secrete powers: 
understanding the irrational behaviour of the puppy buying publics. RSPCA, London
RSPCA (2020) RSPCA calls for crackdown on puppy imports ahead of festive rush. https:// www. short 
url. at/ yFM29. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Sollund R (2019) The crime of wildlife trafficking: issues of justice, legality and morality. Routledge, 
London
South N, Brisman A (eds) (2020) Routledge international handbook of green criminology, 2nd edn. Rout-
ledge, London
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2000) United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime definition. https:// www. unodc. org/ unodc/ en/ organ ized- crime/ intro/ UNTOC. html. 
Accessed 2 Nov 2020
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2020) World wildlife crime report trafficking in protected 
species. https:// www. unodc. org/ docum ents/ data- and- analy sis/ wildl ife/ 2020/ World_ Wildl ife_ 
Report_ 2020_ 9July. pdf. Accessed 2 Nov 2020
Van Uhm D (2016) The Illegal Wildlife Trade: inside the world of poachers, smugglers and traders. 
Springer, London
 Trends in Organized Crime
1 3
Wyatt T, Johnson K, Hunter L, George R, Gunter R (2017a) Corruption and wildlife trafficking: three 
case studies involving Asia. Asian J Criminol 13:35–55. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ s11417- 017- 9255-8
Wyatt T, Maher J, Biddle P (2017b) Scoping research on the illegal importation and farming of puppies. 
Scottish Government and Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs
Wyatt T, van Uhm D, Nurse A (2020) Differentiating criminal networks in the illegal wildlife trade: 
organised, corporate and disorganised crime. Trends Organ Crime 10:20. https:// doi. org/ 10. 1007/ 
s12117- 020- 09385-9
Zucca P, Rossmann M, Osorio J, Karem K, De Benedictis P, Haißl J, De Franceschi P, Calligaris E, Kohl-
weiß M, Meddi G, Gabrutsch W, Mairitsch H, Greco O, Furlani R, Maggio M, Tolomei M, Brem-
ini A, Fischinger I, Zambotto P, Wagner P, Millard Y, Palei M, Zamaro G (2020) The “bio-crime 
model” of cross-border cooperation among veterinary public health, justice, law enforcements, and 
customs to tackle the illegal animal trade/bio-terrorism and to prevent the spread of zoonotic dis-
eases among human population. Front Vet Sci 7:855
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published 
maps and institutional affiliations.
